












This commentary puts pressure on the ‘‘resistance to dissipation’’ criterion for Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s conception
of ‘‘autopoietic bodies.’’ It argues that resistance to dissipation can only be assessed against the backdrop of certain back-
ground conditions. If this is right then it is no longer so clear that systems not considered as autopoietic bodies but
merely as autopoietic systems do not fulfill the requirements of being an autopoietic body.
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Villalobos and Razeto-Barry (henceforth V&RB) argue
that amending the definition of living beings in
Autopoietic Theory from ‘‘autopoietic systems’’ to
‘‘autopoietic bodies’’ better captures the original spirit
of the proposal. Furthermore, by characterizing living
beings as autopoietic bodies, they are able to make a
principled distinction between systems that we com-
monly identify as organisms and the larger (potentially
autopoietic) systems of which these organisms may also
be a part. On this view, (a) being an autopoietic system
is not sufficient for being a living system, only neces-
sary, and (b) autopoietic systems are not defined as
producing their own physical boundary. Rather, what
is necessary for being a living system (or ‘‘organism’’) is
that an autopoietic system’s material components are
in physical proximity and are resistant to dissipation—
what V&RB refer to as being an ‘‘autopoietic body.’’
This distinction between autopoietic systems and
autopoietic bodies opens up the space for ‘‘autopoiesis’’
to be used in the more general, abstract way that it
already often is in work inspired by Maturana (such as
in social systems theory). Used in this way ‘‘autopoi-
esis’’—the abstraction of the autopoietic organization
from its biological instantiation in for example, a cell—
potentially maps on to what the enactivists refer to as
‘‘autonomous organisation.’’ Similarly, what V&RB
are calling ‘‘autopoietic bodies’’ seems to map onto
what enactivists call ‘‘autopoiesis’’ while allowing us to
coherently include multicellular organisms within that
category. I see this rebranding as having the potential
to move us beyond terminological differences giving
autopoietic theorists and enactivists a new shared lan-
guage that will do a better job of bringing out what
they have in common. However, I have worries about
defining ‘‘autopoietic bodies’’ in terms of physical prox-
imity and resistance to dissipation.
V&RB replace the role that the boundary has tradi-
tionally played in cellular/organismic autopoietic sys-
tems with physical proximity and resistance to
dissipation. Physical proximity on its own is clearly not
enough to play the role of distinguishing an autopoietic
body. On the face of it the requirement that a physically
proximal autopoietic system is also resistant to dissipa-
tion does seem to allow this. However, the resistance to
dissipation criterion is worryingly dependent on envi-
ronmental conditions rather than internal dynamics.
While it might be the case that at sea level on planet
earth it is my internal organization that makes my body
resistant to dissipation this is contingent on the pressure
in which my body has evolved. Change the pressure
Eidyn Research Centre, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language
Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Corresponding author:
Mog Stapleton, Eidyn Research Centre, School of Philosophy, Psychology
and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart
Building, 3 Charles Street, EH8 9AD Edinburgh, UK.
Email: mog.stapleton.philosophy@gmail.com
enough in either direction and my body’s resistance to
dissipation reduces until it finally doesn’t pose any
resistance. This is, of course, an example outwith the
realms of those in which the organism that is my body
has evolved to be a system. Nevertheless, the example
highlights two things: (a) that resistance to dissipation
comes in degrees, and V&RB have not yet made clear
what the lower bound of this might have to be to satisfy
the requirements for being an autopoietic body, and (b)
that once we acknowledge that resistance to dissipation
can only be assessed against the backdrop of certain
background conditions then it is no longer so clear that
systems not considered as autopoietic bodies but merely
as autopoietic systems, such as V&RB’s example of
Gaia, do not fulfill the requirements of being an autop-
oietic body. Why is the earth’s gravity a different kind
of background condition from the pressure level that
keeps me from dissipating?
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Dave Ward for his valuable comments on a
previous draft of this commentary.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,




Mog Stapleton is a postdoc in philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Her background is in phi-
losophy of cognitive science with a specific focus on embodied, enactive and affective approaches to
cognition and consciousness.
2 Adaptive Behavior
